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Negotiable Votes: Pre-Vote Negotiations in Binary Voting with Non-Manipulable Rules

Grandi, Umberto and Grossi, Davide and Turrini, Paolo Negotiable Votes: Pre-Vote Negotiations in Binary Voting with Non-Manipulable Rules. (2019) Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 64. 895-929. ISSN 1076-9757

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11446

Abstract

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their ballots with the other participants. We analyse the voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game when ballots are aggregated via non-manipulable rules and, more specifically, quota rules. We show under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed and desirable ones sustained as a consequence of the pre-vote phase.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:https://www.jair.org/index.php/jair/article/view/11446
HAL Id:hal-02451048
Audience (journal):International peer-reviewed journal
Uncontrolled Keywords:
Institution:French research institutions > Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse - Toulouse INP (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UT3 (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT2J (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT1 (FRANCE)
Other partners > University of Groningen (NETHERLANDS)
Other partners > University of Warwick (UNITED KINGDOM)
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Deposited On:08 Jan 2020 08:46

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