Attanasi, Giuseppe and Hopfensitz, Astrid and Lorini, Emiliano and Moisan, Frédéric
Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes.
(2016)
European Economic Review, 90. 86-106. ISSN 0014-2921
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(Document in English)
PDF (Author's version) - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader 1MB |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.02.006
Abstract
We study the impact of social ties on behavior in two types of asymmetric coordination games. Social ties are varied by making players interact with partners from different in-groups (fellow members of their own sports team, members of their sports club, students of their university). Subjective social ties are further measured by direct questionnaires. We find that smaller and more salient in-groups lead to significantly more group beneficial choices. The same effect is observed for players that report high values of their subjective social ties. We discuss the implication of these results for theories assuming that socially tied individuals follow some group beneficial reasoning.
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | Thanks to Springer editor. The original PDF can be found at European Economic Review (ISSN 0014-2921) website : https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292116300186 |
Audience (journal): | International peer-reviewed journal |
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Institution: | French research institutions > Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS (FRANCE) Université de Toulouse > Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse - Toulouse INP (FRANCE) Other partners > Université de Strasbourg - UNISTRA (FRANCE) Other partners > University of Cambridge (UNITED KINGDOM) Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UT3 (FRANCE) Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT2J (FRANCE) Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT1 (FRANCE) Other partners > Toulouse School of Economics - TSE (FRANCE) |
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Deposited On: | 03 May 2018 08:19 |
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