Preference Change

Abstract

Most models of rational action assume that all possible states and actions are pre-defined and that preferences change only when beliefs do. But several decision and game problems lack these features, calling for a dynamic model of preferences: preferences can change when unforeseen possibilities come to light or when there is no specifiable or measurable change in belief. We propose a formally precise dynamic model of preferences that extends an existing static model (Boutilier et al. in J Artif Intell Res 21:135-191, 2004). Our axioms for updating preferences preserve consistency while minimising change, like Hansson's (Theory Decis 38(1):1-28, 1995). But unlike prior models of preference change, ours supports default reasoning with partial preference information, which is essential to handle decision problems where the decision tree isn't surveyable. We also show that our model avoids problems for other models of preference change discussed in Spohn (Preference change: approaches from philosophy. Economics and Psychology: Springer, pp 109-121, 2009).