Ben Amor, Nahla and Essghaier, Fatma and Fargier, Hélène Egalitarian collective decision making under qualitative possibilistic uncertainty: Principles and characterization. (2015) In: 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2015), 24 January 2015 - 30 January 2015 (Austin, Texas, United States).
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Abstract
This paper raises the question of collective decisionmaking under possibilistic uncertainty; We study fouregalitarian decision rules and show that in the contextof a possibilistic representation of uncertainty, the useof an egalitarian collective utility function allows toget rid of the Timing Effect. Making a step further,we prove that if both the agents’ preferences and thecollective ranking of the decisions satisfy Dubois andPrade’s axioms (1995), and particularly risk aversion,and Pareto Unanimity, then the egalitarian collectiveaggregation is compulsory. This result can be seen asan ordinal counterpart of Harsanyi’s theorem (1955).
Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
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Additional Information: | This papers appears in AAAI'15 ISBN:0-262-51129-0 The definitive version is available at: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2888116.2888200 |
Audience (conference): | International conference proceedings |
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Institution: | French research institutions > Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS (FRANCE) Université de Toulouse > Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse - Toulouse INP (FRANCE) Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UT3 (FRANCE) Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT2J (FRANCE) Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT1 (FRANCE) Other partners > Université de Tunis (TUNISIA) |
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Deposited On: | 17 Mar 2016 14:36 |
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