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Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes

Attanasi, Giuseppe and Hopfensitz, Astrid and Lorini, Emiliano and Moisan, Frédéric Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes. (2016) European Economic Review, vol. 90. pp. 86-106. ISSN 0014-2921

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.02.006

Abstract

We study the impact of social ties on behavior in two types of asymmetric coordination games. Social ties are varied by making players interact with partners from different in-groups (fellow members of their own sports team, members of their sports club, students of their university). Subjective social ties are further measured by direct questionnaires. We find that smaller and more salient in-groups lead to significantly more group beneficial choices. The same effect is observed for players that report high values of their subjective social ties. We discuss the implication of these results for theories assuming that socially tied individuals follow some group beneficial reasoning.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Thanks to Springer editor. The original PDF can be found at European Economic Review (ISSN 0014-2921) website : https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292116300186
Audience (journal):International peer-reviewed journal
Uncontrolled Keywords:
Institution:French research institutions > Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse - INPT (FRANCE)
Other partners > Université de Strasbourg - UNISTRA (FRANCE)
Other partners > University of Cambridge (UNITED KINGDOM)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UPS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT2J (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT1 (FRANCE)
Other partners > Toulouse School of Economics - TSE (FRANCE)
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Deposited By: IRIT IRIT
Deposited On:03 May 2018 08:19

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