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Equilibrium refinement through negotiation in binary voting

Grandi, Umberto and Grossi, Davide and Turrini, Paolo Equilibrium refinement through negotiation in binary voting. (2015) In: 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015), 25 July 2015 - 31 July 2015 (Buenos Aires, Argentina).

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Official URL: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2832324

Abstract

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters might hold an objective over some issues at stake, while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones, and can influence one another’s voting decision before the vote takes place. We analyse voters’ rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the prevote phase.

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information:Thanks to AAAI Press. This papers appears in IJCAI'15 ISBN: 978-1-57735-738-4 The definitive version is available at: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2832324
Audience (conference):International conference proceedings
Uncontrolled Keywords:
Institution:French research institutions > Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse - INPT (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UPS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT2J (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT1 (FRANCE)
Other partners > Imperial College London (UNITED KINGDOM)
Other partners > University of Liverpool (UNITED KINGDOM)
Laboratory name:
Statistics:download
Deposited By: IRIT IRIT
Deposited On:25 Apr 2017 14:03

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