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Evaluating Power of Agents from Dependence Relations in Boolean Games

Ben-Naim, Jonathan and Lorini, Emiliano Evaluating Power of Agents from Dependence Relations in Boolean Games. (2014) In: International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - AMAAS 2014, 5 May 2014 - 9 May 2014 (Paris, France).

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Abstract

In this paper we propose a new methodology for evaluating the relative power of agents in a strategic situation formally represented by a boolean game. The methodology consists in extracting a power ranking from the dependence relation induced by a certain boolean game. Our approach is axiomatic. We provide a number of desirable postulates that a notion of dependence is expected to satisfy and we compare competing notions of dependence, included a notion based on the concept of veto player, with respect to them. Similarly, we provide a set of postulates for power functions (i.e., the family of functions mapping dependence graphs to power rankings) and evaluate some new methods as well as existing ones (e.g., Pagerank) with respect to this set of postulates.

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information:Thanks to ACM editor. The definitive version is available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2615868
HAL Id:hal-01140353
Audience (conference):International conference proceedings
Uncontrolled Keywords:
Institution:Université de Toulouse > Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse - INPT (FRANCE)
French research institutions > Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UPS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT2J (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT1 (FRANCE)
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Deposited By: IRIT IRIT
Deposited On:24 Mar 2015 07:09

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