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Logics for Non-Cooperative Games with Expectations

Godo, Lluis and Marchioni, Enrico Logics for Non-Cooperative Games with Expectations. (2013) In: European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems - EUMAS 2013, 12 December 2013 - 13 December 2013 (Toulouse, France).

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Abstract

We introduce the logics E(G) for reasoning about probabilistic expectation over classes G of games with discrete polynomial payoff functions represented by finite-valued Lukasiewicz formulas and provide completeness and complexity results. In addition, we introduce a new class of games where players’ expected payoff functions are encoded by E(G)-formulas. In these games each player’s aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players’ expectations over an outcome as well as their own. We offer a logical and computational characterisation of this new class of games.

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information:Thanks to Ceur-ws editor. The definitive version is available at http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1113/
HAL Id:hal-01141906
Audience (conference):International conference proceedings
Uncontrolled Keywords:
Institution:French research institutions > Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS (FRANCE)
Other partners > Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas - CSIC (SPAIN)
Université de Toulouse > Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse - INPT (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UPS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT2J (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT1 (FRANCE)
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Deposited By: IRIT IRIT
Deposited On:14 Apr 2015 08:27

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