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Strategic Conversation

Asher, Nicholas and Lascarides, Alex Strategic Conversation. (2013) Semantics and Pragmatics, 6. 1-58. ISSN 1937-8912

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.6.2

Abstract

Models of conversation that rely on a strong notion of cooperation don’t apply to strategic conversation — that is, to conversation where the agents’ motives don’t align, such as courtroom cross examination and political debate. We provide a game-theoretic framework that provides an analysis of both cooperative and strategic conversation. Our analysis features a new notion of safety that applies to implicatures: an implicature is safe when it can be reliably treated as a matter of public record. We explore the safety of implicatures within cooperative and non cooperative settings. We then provide a symbolic model enabling us (i) to prove a correspondence result between a characterisation of conversation in terms of an alignment of players’ preferences and one where Gricean principles of cooperative conversation like Sincerity hold, and (ii) to show when an implicature is safe and when it is not.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Thanks to Linguistic Society of America editor. The definitive version is available at http://semprag.org/article/view/sp.6.2
HAL Id:hal-01124401
Audience (journal):International peer-reviewed journal
Uncontrolled Keywords:
Institution:French research institutions > Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse - INPT (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - UPS (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT2J (FRANCE)
Université de Toulouse > Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT1 (FRANCE)
Other partners > University of Edinburgh (UNITED KINGDOM)
Laboratory name:
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Deposited By: IRIT IRIT
Deposited On:06 Mar 2015 08:23

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